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Tackling Antisemitism within English Football: A Critical Analysis 
of Policies and Campaigns using a Multiple Streams Approach 
 
Emma Poulton 




While the anti-racist movement in English football has been established for 25 years, 
antisemitism was not specifically addressed until much later – most publicly through 
anti-discrimination organisation Kick It Out’s The Y-Word (2011) film campaigning 
against the use of ‘Yid’ in football fan culture. Antisemitism has occupied a sporadic 
position on football’s wider anti-racism agenda. Antisemitism in football is also a 
neglected area of research. The article addresses this academic indifference by 
contributing a critical analysis of the intermittent responses to antisemitism in English 
men’s football – by governing bodies, campaigners, and criminal justice system – using 
a multiple streams approach to understand policy formulation, legitimation and 
implementation, arguing these attempts have usually been reactive and sometimes 
misguided, inconsistent, or misaligned with existing legislation. The role of ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ is considered in relation to individuals lobbying for and influencing the 
priority of tackling formations of antisemitism amidst broader attempts to combat 
racism and faith-based abuse in football. This empirically-grounded critical analysis is 
informed by primary data from interviews with elite stakeholders from English football 
(The Football Association; Kick It Out) and Jewish community (Board of Deputies of 
British Jews; Jewish Leadership Council; Community Security Trust; Maccabi GB). 
The article explains the changing political salience of combating antisemitism and 
concludes with a call for a more congruous and coherent approach to addressing 
antisemitism, faith-based abuse and other forms of discrimination in football, which 
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This article uses interviews with elite stakeholders to explain the changing political 
salience of attempts to address antisemitism within English football, and the policy 
processes involved, through the lens of a multiple streams approach (Kingdon 1984).  
There have been high profile incidents of an antisemitic nature within English men’s 
football over the last decade involving supporters, professional players, coaches and 
officials. The increase in reports of antisemitism to Kick It Out (2019) – English 
football’s equality and inclusion campaigning organisation – mirror the incremental rise 
in reported incidents of antisemitism more broadly within the UK (Community Security 
Trust 2018, 2019); a trend that is reflected globally against a backdrop of far-right 
political parties and populist movements thriving across Europe. This has found 
expression in acts of terror against Jewish communities by extremists in France, 
Denmark and the USA. 
 Space precludes a comprehensive review the origins and different ways of 
theorising the phenomenon of antisemitism, nor its socio-historical manifestations (see 
Hirsh 2018; Kushner 2013; Meer 2013). Whilst acknowledging that antisemitism is a 
complex and contested phenomenon – with scholarly, political, legal and religious 
debates as to whether it should be recognised and treated as a distinct form of racism 
(Meer 2013; Meer and Noorani 2008) – the article adheres to the International 
Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (2016) ‘Working Definition’1 of antisemitism as: 
A certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. 
Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward 
Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish 




The definition is accompanied by a list of examples, which illustrate how contemporary 
permutations are based on one, or a combination, of religion (anti-Judaism), ethnicity 
(racism), or geo-politics (anti-Zionism). The latter is exacerbated by the situation in 
Palestine and Gaza and hostilities toward the State of Israel (see Dart 2017), which can 
trigger spikes in antisemitic incidents (CST, 2018). Antisemitic rhetoric can include: 
tropes or allegations of Jewish conspiracy, wealth, power, manipulation, immorality, 
hostility to others; and Holocaust denial, justification, distortion, or trivialisation. 
 It is unlikely that most antisemitism within the context of contemporary English 
football is motivated by genuine anti-Jewish, neo-Nazi sentiments, nor even anti-
Zionist sentiments.2 This is in contrast to, for example, Hungary (Győri Szabó 2019), 
Poland (Woźniak 2018), Italy (Doidge 2015) and the Balkans (Brentin 2015), where 
the problem of antisemitism is much worse in football and wider society, as a reflection 
of these nations’ far-left or far-right political and martial histories and contemporary 
politics, which influence the allegiances and motivations of leftist and right-wing 
‘Ultra’ groups that are found in their fan cultures. Notwithstanding this observation, 
antisemitic rhetoric is still very much evident in English football – especially among 
supporters – where it is used to signify collective identity and express club rivalry and 
hostility, especially toward Tottenham Hotspur due to the club’s perceived ‘Jewish’ 
association, as will be discussed later.  
 While the anti-racist movement in English football developed over twenty-five 
years ago and is now firmly established and supported by a raft of equalities law and 
football-specific legislation that has criminalised racism in football (Garland and Rowe 
2001 2014), antisemitism was not specifically addressed until much later. This was 
done most conspicuously by Kick It Out’s euphemistically-titled The Y-Word (2011) 
campaign film, which challenged the controversial use of the Jewish ethnonym ‘Yid’ 
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within the vernacular culture of football fans (Poulton and Durell 2016; Poulton 2016). 
Antisemitism per se has occupied a sporadic position on the wider anti-racism agenda 
in English football since its late arrival. Similarly, while racism, racialisation and anti-
racism within English football has been widely studied (for example, Back, Crabbe and 
Solomos 2001; Burdsey 2011, 2014; Cleland and Cashmore 2014, 2016; Garland and 
Rowe 2001, 2014; Lawrence and Davis 2019) and also elsewhere in Europe 
(Kasssimeris 2009), faith-based abuse and especially antisemitism within football is a 
neglected area of academic research. Academic focus instead tends to be on the 
experiences of black and, to a lesser extent, Asian players, coaches, and supporters and 
attempts to address the processes of racialisation and forms of racism towards them. 
Outside sport studies, there is negligible acknowledgement of the presence of 
antisemitism within football, never mind the nature or scale of the problem at both the 
professional and grass roots levels of the game. This is peculiar given that football is a 
ubiquitous part of popular culture in all developed countries and antisemitism is a global 
and very current socio-political problem. 
There have also been few attempts to theoretically explain and analyse 
policymaking processes for anti-racism initiatives – within the context of sport and 
more broadly – applying meso-level frameworks of policy formulation and 
implementation. Nor has bespoke policymaking to address antisemitism received much 
focus. This empirically-informed critical analysis addresses these academic neglects by 
chronologically charting and critiquing the intermittent responses to antisemitism in 
English football by governing bodies, campaigners, and the criminal justice system 
using a multi-streams approach (MSA) (Kingdon 1984). These attempts to tackle 
antisemitism have usually been reactive and sometimes misguided, inconsistent, or 
misaligned with existing legislation. This is mainly due to the ill-defined nature of what 
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the problem(s) is/are within the context of English football and therefore how different 
expressive forms of antisemitism can be effectively addressed, as antisemitism 
competes for the attention on the wider anti-discrimination agenda. 
The integral role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ – individuals with power, tenacity, 
or luck, to heighten levels of attention to policy problems to promote their ‘pet 
solutions’ (Kingdon 1984) – is highlighted in relation to such personnel influencing the 
position of tackling antisemitism amidst wider attempts to combat racism, faith-based 
abuse and other forms of discrimination in football. The following section provides an 
abridged history of anti-racism in English football, giving particular focus to the role of 
The Football Association (The FA) and Kick It Out. It also briefly explains the 
peculiarities in defining and consequently addressing antisemitism. 
 
Anti-Racism Activism in English Football 
Both UEFA, as the governing body of football in Europe, and the sport’s highest 
international authority, FIFA, have been criticised for being ‘white institutions’ and for 
their lack of serious action to combat racism – especially through their derisory 
sanctions distributed to clubs and national governing bodies found in breach of anti-
racist regulations (see Cleland and Cashmore 2014). As English football’s national 
governing body (NGB), The FA, regulates all aspects of the amateur and professional 
game within its territory, including issues pertaining to equality, diversity and inclusion. 
The NGB is the focal organisation with the authority for policymaking in this respect, 
not the Government, nor anti-discrimination groups like Kick It Out or Show Racism 
the Red Card. Notwithstanding this, The FA arrived comparatively late to the table in 
terms of addressing racism in football. The anti-racist movement in English football 
first developed over twenty-five years ago involving independent campaigning 
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organisations with a national remit and local supporter-based initiatives, rather than the 
NGB (Back et al. 2001). Kick It Out (originally, Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football), 
was founded in 1993 by Lord Herman Ouseley, then Chair of the Commission for 
Racial Equality (CRE) – together with the players’ trade union, Professional 
Footballers’ Association (PFA) – in response to growing concerns about racial abuse 
directed at their black members by supporters and racist attitudes more broadly within 
the sport, on and off the pitch. 
 Back et al. (2001: 193) observe how, ‘From its inception The FA gave its tacit 
approval to the CRE-PFA… this support initially had little substance and it seemed 
driven by a rather defensive public relations imperative rather than any understanding 
of or commitment to the issues at stake’. David Davies’ appointment to a new post of 
Director of Public Relations ahead of the 1994-95 season marked something of a sea-
change as The FA ‘moved quickly to occupy a more central position in the campaign 
against racism in football’ (ibid.). However, Back at al. (2001: 194) argue The FA’s 
concern was ‘driven by a more fundamental desire to prevent forms of fan behaviour 
that were seen as highly media sensitive and damaging to the game’s public image’, 
rather than taking a broader interest in the forms of racism that prevailed in English 
football’s changing rooms, committee rooms and boardrooms. This is symptomatic of 
the conflation of ‘hooliganism’ and racism that dominated debates around social policy 
and anti-racism at this time (Back et al. 2001). 
 In 1997, Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football was formally constituted as a charity 
and undertook a name-change to Kick It Out. The organisation works throughout the 
football, educational and community sectors to challenge discrimination, encourage 
inclusive practices, and campaign for positive change. It has no jurisdiction over 
supporters, players (professional or amateur), officials or administrators, despite public 
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assumptions. This misconception has led to criticism from some supporters (Cleland 
and Cashmore 2014), as well as accusations of ‘tokenism’ by high profile black 
footballers such as Rio Ferdinand. Similarly, Raheem Sterling has commented, ‘A few 
times they get us to wear a t-shirt, but it is not enough. There needs to be harder 
punishments’; in this connection, he called upon The FA and English Premier League 
to consider, ‘Teams getting points deductions, getting kicked out... this is when people 
start taking it seriously’ (Dean 2019). 
 Kick It Out is (under-)funded by The FA, English Premier League, English 
Football League, and PFA, who each have a trustee on the board. For the 2018/19 
season, Kick It Out received a total of £645,000 from their funders: £270,000 from the 
Premier League, and £125,000 each from the English Football League, The FA, and 
PFA (Wilson 2019). Despite this resource dependency, Kick It Out maintains its status 
as independent of – and so occasionally critical of – the NGB and the other 
organisations within English football’s power structure. In this sense, Kick It Out are 
best understood as a ‘gatekeeper’ for equality, diversity and inclusion in English 
football. 
Kick It Out’s commitment to widening their focus to all forms of discrimination 
was further emphasised in July 2014 when they changed their constitution following 
Roisin Wood’s arrival as CEO to encapsulate their work on disability, homophobia, 
biphobia and transphobia (see Magrath and Stott 2018) and also faith-related abuse. A 
related dimension of racialisation and racism in football is faith or religious prejudice 
or intolerance because ‘Jews and Muslims define themselves – and are defined by 
others – through reference to race and religion’ (Meer and Noorani 2008: 196). Both 
biological and cultural discourses are invoked in the racialisation of religious 
minorities. Kick It Out (2018) report that ‘a number of issues surrounding antisemitism 
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and anti-Muslim hate continue to hamper the game at all levels both domestically and 
internationally’. There are around 50+ Muslim footballers currently playing in the 
English Premier League, with global stars like Liverpool’s Mo Salah regularly targeted 
with Islamophobic abuse. 
Very little focused academic attention has been given specifically to faith-based 
abuse to date. Exceptions are Millward’s (2008) and Kilvington and Price’s (2012) 
work on Islamophobia and my own previous research on antisemitism (Poulton 2016; 
Poulton and Durell 2016). To date, there has been no systematic academic focus upon 
attempts to tackle antisemitism within football. The next section explains the changing 
nature and prevalence of antisemitism within English football, illustrating how the 
phenomenon and processes of racialisation are manifest in various forms across the four 
inter-related fields within the broader structure of football culture: the cultural 
industries, institutional level, occupational level, and the vernacular culture of fans 
(Back et al. 2001). 
  
Antisemitism in English Football 
Although the implementation and gradual impact of anti-racist initiatives and also 
legislation targeting football supporters has ‘created an environment in which the 
routine expression of racism in the form of chanting and abusing players and other 
supporters has become unacceptable’ (Garland and Rowe 2014: 94), antisemitism – like 
other forms of discrimination – is still evident within English football fan culture and 
other spheres of the game. There has been an annually rising number of reported 
incidents of discrimination to Kick It Out and the overwhelming majority of reported 
faith-related incidents are of an antisemitic nature. In the 2011/12 season, eight of the 
overall 78 reports pertained to antisemitism, while 50 of the total 422 reported incidents 
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during 2018/19 were classified antisemitic (Kick It Out 2019). These increases could 
be indicative of the concurrent culture of ‘naming and shaming’, whereby people will 
more readily ‘call out’ others’ misdemeanours. In English fan culture, supporters also 
sometimes self-police and challenge behaviour that is seen as lacking ‘class’, especially 
on social media. Another consideration – especially given the cumulative reports – is 
the introduction of Kick It Out’s smart phone app in 2013 to facilitate discreet reporting 
of discriminatory abuse and supporters potentially having more confidence that their 
complaint will be dealt with.  
Rhetorical and even physical manifestations of antisemitism within English 
football fan culture were much more prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s, when 
extreme right groups like the National Front and Combat 18 infiltrated and attempted 
to recruit from football’s then more working-class fan-base and football-related 
disorder was also at its most acute (Back et al. 2001). During these decades, Nazi salutes 
were not an uncommon sight in English football crowds, just as black players regularly 
endured ‘monkey’ chants and gestures and having bananas thrown at them. In the early 
1980s, rival supporters revised the lyrics of a favourite Tottenham Hotspur (nicknamed 
‘Spurs’) song – ‘Spurs are on their way to Wembley’ (the national stadium, which hosts 
cup finals) – to: ‘Spurs are on their way to Auschwitz. Hitler’s gonna gas them again’ 
because of the club’s perceived ‘Jewish’ identity (Poulton 2016). This identity 
originates from Tottenham historically attracting Jewish supporters due to the north 
London club’s geographical proximity to near-by Jewish communities who settled there 
in the early twentieth century after fleeing persecution in Russia and then Europe. In 
Tottenham Hotspur’s (2014) survey of season-ticket holders, 9.97 per cent of 
respondents (n.11389) self-declared they were Jewish.  
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 Although the majority of Tottenham’s fan-base is not Jewish, the club’s 
supporters are all ‘othered’ as such. Football supporters have a tendency to go for the 
perceived Achilles’ heel of their rivals to wind them up and get under their skin. 
Consequently, Tottenham supporters have traditionally been, and remain, regular 
targets of antisemitic rhetoric from other clubs’ fans. Opponents’ songs, chants and 
social media posts employ Jewish stereotypes (especially about thriftiness) and in their 
most odious form reference Hitler and the Nazi extermination camps of the Holocaust. 
They also make hissing sounds to emulate the noise of Zyklon B dispersal in the Nazi 
gas chambers. One of my interviewees’s, Kick It Out’s CEO Roisin Wood, revealed 
that the number of reports of antisemitism that they receive, ‘Spike after Tottenham 
play. It spikes every time Tottenham play a London club, especially if they’re playing 
Chelsea or West Ham’.  
 By illustration, footage emerged on social media in January 2017 of a small 
group of Manchester City fans on a tram travelling to their match against Tottenham 
singing: ‘You’re getting gassed in the morning’, with one shouting: ‘Fuck off, you 
fucking Yids. Fucking gas isn’t good enough for ya’ – both overt references to the 
treatment of Jews in the death camps during World War 2. Antisemitic rhetoric towards 
Tottenham supporters in England seems rarely underpinned by anti-Zionist geo-
politics. An exception came following Tottenham’s defeat in the UEFA Champions 
League Final 2019, when maverick politician and broadcaster George Galloway 
tweeted his congratulations to Liverpool, adding ‘No #Israël flags on the Cup! … I 
despise the flag of Apartheid Israël at White Hart Lane, Ibrox [Glasgow Rangers FC], 
East Belfast’. 
 Despite sustained forms of antisemitism towards Tottenham supporters, they 
themselves have been the apparent primary focus of campaigns and policy interventions 
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to combat antisemitism in English football, as will be discussed below. This is because 
Tottenham supporters – both Gentiles and Jews – have for some forty years 
appropriated and paradoxically used the taboo term ‘Yid’ and moniker ‘Yid Army’ as 
one of endearment in their own songs and chants to affront the routinised antisemitic 
abuse they endure (Poulton 2016). While many people in Britain today might conceive 
‘Yid’ to be an ethnic epithet and ‘race hate’ word, it is a term that has taken on differing 
subcultural meanings within the context of English football fandom (ibid.). Given the 
longevity of the use of ‘Yid’ and derivatives like ‘Yiddo’, these have now become 
normalised and synonymous with being a Tottenham supporter for many of their 
number, rather than pertaining to Jewishness. Such terms are proudly used by 
Tottenham supporters as an affectionate self-referent and certainly not used by them as 
invective to express Jew-hate.3 Yet there have been a series of attempts to challenge 
Tottenham supporters’ use of these words on the grounds that they are tacitly 
antisemitic and that their usage fuels and sustains the antisemitic rhetoric of other 
supporters (Poulton 2016). 
Notwithstanding the focus upon football supporters by anti-racist pieces of work 
– such as Kick It Out’s The Y-Word (2011) film campaign and The Football Association 
(2013) – there have been high profile incidents of antisemitic rhetoric occurring within 
the institutional and occupational spheres of English professional men’s football 
involving administrators, club owners, coaches and players over recent years. In 
November 2014, Wigan Athletic owner, Dave Whelan, was fined and temporarily 
banned from football-related activity by The FA for employing an age-old trope about 
perceived Jewish wealth and thrift as he claimed, ‘Jews chase money more than 
everyone else’ in a newspaper interview (Conn 2014). There were accusations of 
antisemitism at the very top of English football’s institutional pyramid in March 2018 
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when The FA’s Chief Executive, Martin Glenn, likened the Star of David to Nazi 
swastikas and images of Robert Mugabe as he attempted to defend the NGB’s ban on 
the display of political symbols during matches (Winter 2018). Glenn was roundly 
criticised by Jewish community organisations and Kick It Out for his remarks about the 
religious symbol of immense importance to Jews. Winter (2018), Chief Football Writer 
for The Times, pointedly questioned: ‘How can players and clubs take The FA seriously 
after Martin Glenn’s crass comments?’ 
The most prominent incident within football’s occupational culture occurred 
during an English Premier League match in December 2013. West Bromwich Albion 
player Nicolas Anelka celebrated scoring with a ‘quenelle’ gesture, recognised as a 
reversed Nazi salute (despite his protestations) because of its association with French 
comedian, Dieudonne M’bala M’bala – Anelka’s friend – who has convictions for 
inciting racial hatred against Jews in France. All of my interviewees referred to the 
impact of the Anelka case on the Jewish community and the disciplinary sanctions 
imposed on him by The FA, as discussed below.  
In contrast, in April 2019 an independent regulatory panel appointed by The FA 
found the disciplinary charge against Crystal Palace footballer, Wayne Hennessey – 
who appeared to make a Nazi salute in a restaurant – ‘unproven’. Hennessey’s defence 
was that he was attempting to attract the attention of the photographer (a German 
teammate). Incredulously, the panel found Hennessey displayed ‘a very considerable – 
one might even say lamentable – degree of ignorance about anything to do with Hitler, 
fascism and the Nazi regime’ and advised he ‘familiarised himself with events’. 
Evidently there is dire need for more directed education and awareness-raising 





Explaining policy change through the multiple streams approach 
 
The history of equality, diversity and inclusion in UK sport policy, process and practice 
has been explicated by the collective work of, among others, Collins and Kay (2014) 
and Hylton and Long (2016). Although there is abundant research into racism and anti-
racism in football, this has primarily evaluated the implementation and effectiveness of 
the anti-racism movement (Dixon, Lowes and Gibbons 2014; Garland and Rowe 2014, 
2001; Lusted 2013). Most of this work fails to explicitly consider theories, models and 
concepts associated with frameworks of policy formulation and implementation evident 
in social and political sciences. The important work of Hylton (2010) theorises anti-
racism in sport through Critical Race Theory, but does not theoretically explain the 
particularities of the policy process of anti-racism activists, organisations and agencies.  
Kingdon (1984) adapted the ‘garbage can model’4 of choice to explain public 
policymaking and output by the US federal government. Since then, the simplicity and 
flexibility of MSA has led to many modern applications to a variety of contexts (Jones 
et al. 2016). MSA is presented here as a useful point of entry for analysing the policy 
process pertaining to attempts to tackle antisemitism in football because: first, it is one 
of the more fully articulated and internally coherent frameworks for policy analysis 
(Cairney 2018; Cairney and Jones 2016; Weible and Schlager 2016; Zahariadis 2007); 
second, it has been widely applied empirically (Jones et al. 2016); third, it has also been 
applied to policy analysis within the context of sport (Houlihan and Green 2006; Piggin 
and Hart 2017).  
 MSA uses the metaphor of ‘streams’ and ‘windows of opportunity’ to give 
greater emphasis to the role of agency, coincidence and opportunism – albeit within an 
identifiable pattern of organisational arrangements – to explain agenda-setting and 
processes of policy change and policymaking (Zahariadis 2007). The scope of this 
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framework provides an opportunity to explore the inter-relationships between ideas, 
individual policy actors, lobbyists/interest group activity, and the institutional 
arrangements that structure (if only loosely) the opportunities for influence. In doing 
so, MSA illuminates the importance of receptivity to policy solutions to policy 
problems within policy networks. 
 MSA contains five elements: problems, policies, politics, policy windows, and 
policy entrepreneurs. Kingdon (1984) regarded policy formation as the result of the 
interplay of three sets of processes, or through his metaphor of ‘streams’ that flow 
through the policy process: problems, policies, and politics. The convergence of all 
three streams dramatically enhances the chances that an issue will receive attention by 
policymakers and that a proposed policy will be adopted (Zahariadis 2007). The 
problem stream consists of various issues or conditions that policymakers (and citizens) 
want addressing, but which vie for ascendancy as attention lurches from one issue to 
another within a heady ‘policy primeval soup’ (Kingdon 1984). The policy stream is 
where potential solutions to particular problems are proposed and may garner favour, 
but windows of opportunity for this to happen are fleeting. This is dependent upon what 
is occurring in the politics stream and conditions such as public mood, lobbyists, and 
the ideological persuasion of those in power.  
 Each stream is ordinarily conceptualised as separate from the others with its 
own dynamics, characteristics and rules. However, at critical points in time (policy 
windows), the streams are joined together or ‘coupled’ by what Kingdon (1984) terms 
policy entrepreneurs: certain highly motivated people who propose solutions to 
problems, mobilising opinion and institutions, thereby ensuring their idea remains 
prominent. Windows of opportunity are ‘opened by compelling problems or by events 
in the political stream’ (Zahariadis 2007: 74) when policy entrepreneurs ‘push their pet 
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solutions, or… push attention to their special problems’ (Kingdon 1984: 165). 
Indicators used to assess the existence and magnitude of a problem, as well as scope for 
change, include the how much traction is gained with policy entrepreneurs and the 
media (Zahariadis 2014). Indeed, the ‘Selection [of policies] is biased by the 
manipulating strategies and skills of policy entrepreneurs’ and their involvement 
‘dramatically enhances the chances that a specific policy will be adopted by policy 
makers’ (Zahariadis 2007: 65).  
 Policy entrepreneurs may be elected politicians, leaders of interest groups, or 
unofficial (even self-appointed) spokespeople for particular causes. They are people 
with the knowledge, power, tenacity and sometimes ‘luck’ to be able to exploit 
windows of opportunity and ‘speak up for a policy problem in a way that sparks 
attention and concern of their audience’ (Cairney 2018: 202). There are three strategies 
or ‘habits’ that effective policy entrepreneurs use to ‘maximise their impact in crowded, 
complex and often unpredictable policy environments’ according to Cairney (2016): 
1. Telling a persuasive story to frame a policy problem to grab an audience’s 
interest; 
2. Ensuring their favoured solution is available before attention lurches to another 
problem; 
3. Exploiting a ‘window of opportunity’ during which policymakers have the 
willingness and ability to adopt their policy solution. 
 
To be ‘skilled at coupling’, two further variables are important for policy entrepreneurs: 
having both ‘resources and access’ (Zahariadis 2007: 78). In other words, financial and 
social capital are needed in order to facilitate the union of all three streams. 
 With regard to antisemitism, campaigners and policymakers within Jewish 
community third-sector organisations, football governing bodies, and campaigning 
groups like Kick It Out have had to compete for attention and search for solutions to 
the cause of antisemitism within the ‘primeval soup’ (to use Kingdon’s metaphor) of 
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other forms of racism and discrimination in football. Figure 1 illustrates the network of 
multiple agencies (potentially) involved in tackling antisemitism within English 
football, although some have, to date, not engaged with the problem. Having outlined 
the central tenets of MSA, it evidently provides a conducive framework to analyse the 
belated then intermittent attention afforded to antisemitism on the wider anti-racism 
agenda in English football and the policy processes at work, as well as the various actors 
involved, most notably, the role of policy entrepreneurs.  
 
Method 
This empirically-informed study has developed from previous research I have 
undertaken on antisemitism in English football, which has primarily explained the uses 
and meanings of ‘Yid’ in fan culture, particularly by Tottenham supporters (Poulton 
and Durell 2016; Poulton 2016). My interest in this phenomenon stemmed from being 
a Tottenham supporter myself and consequently witnessing antisemitic abuse. Hearing 
hissing noises and songs like, ‘I’d rather be a Paki than a Yid’, engendered a 
sociological appetite to understand this form of discrimination more and a committed 
motivation to do something about it.  
 Both Kingdon (1984) and Houlihan and Green (2006) used interviews and 
document analysis methods; indeed ‘most MSA applicants follow the same path’ 
(Cairney and Jones 2016: 44), as does the research design for this study. Qualitative 
data were obtained from eight elite stakeholder interviews and a critical review of 
campaign initiatives in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of attempts to 
tackle antisemitism in English football since it was first officially addressed in 2008 up 
until 2017. In addition, policy and media statements pertaining to antisemitism issued 
by The FA (Mann 2010; The Football Association 2013), non-government agencies and 
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anti-discrimination groups (The Y-Word 2011; Kick It Out 2016) were analysed to gain 
an understanding of the nature of the initiative, and where possible, media and public 
reaction to the initiative.  
 Informed by MSA, elite interviews obtained key actors’ understandings of anti-
racism and anti-discrimination policy processes that would otherwise have been 
inaccessible (Lilleker 2003). Key stakeholders were initially identified from the 
network of agencies that have attempted to address antisemitism in English football 
(see Figure 1).  The rationale for selecting the eight interviewees – detailed in Table 1 
– was because of their current position of authority within their organisation and their 
involvement in the development and/or implementation of campaigns and policy to 
combat antisemitism in English football within the last decade, which they could 
therefore reflect upon and evaluate in terms of effectiveness. I had met three of the 
interviewees previously at conferences (Danny Lynch; Dave Rich; Roisin Wood), so 
corresponded with these first to request an interview. They then served as gatekeepers 
to the other interviewees. Ethical approval was granted by my institution and British 
Sociological Association guidelines were adhered to.  
 
Table 1: Biographical Details of Interviewees 
Interviewee’s Name Organisation Position Dates of 
Service 
Jonathan ARKUSH Board of Deputies of British 
Jews (BoD) – the main 
representative body of British 
Jewry (est. 1760) to deal with 
political matters and to 
safeguard the interests of British 
Jews as a religious community. 
President 2015 – 2018 
Funke AWODERU The Football Association (FA) – 
the national governing body. 




Martin BERLINER Maccabi GB (MGB) – a leading 





Simon JOHNSON Jewish Leadership Council 
(JLC) – a Jewish charity, which 









Jewish organisations to work on 
behalf of the Jewish community. 
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Each interviewee was asked a similar set of questions inviting them to: reflect upon the 
position of antisemitism on the wider anti-racist agenda in football; explain their 
organisation’s involvement in attempts to tackle antisemitism; evaluate the nature and 
effectiveness of these initiatives; assess the character, indicators and causes of change 
in the salience of combating antisemitism in English football; and reflect upon the most 
helpful direction for future campaigns or policy to tackle antisemitism in English 
football. All interviewees gave consent to being audio-recorded and having their name, 
organisation and official title used for research publication purposes. They were given 
the option of advance sight of drafts, with an opportunity to amend or clarify their 
contribution. 
 The interviews were undertaken between March 2017 and September 2017. 
These dates are significant because there were three terror attacks within the UK and 
the CST (2018) also recorded a spike in reports of antisemitism during this seven-month 
period. This data collection period also predates the January 2018 launch of Chelsea 
Football Club’s ‘Say No to Antisemitism’ campaign to raise awareness of and educate 
their players, staff, fans and the wider community about antisemitism in football. As 
such, the interviewees were not asked about Chelsea’s campaign and it was not 
considered to be feasible, nor professional, to return to high profile (and very busy) 
interviewees to subsequently ask them about a new emerging piece of work, which none 
mentioned and, by implication, were involved with/seemed aware of when I 
interviewed them. Furthermore, in terms of policy change, the longer-term significance 
of a single event cannot be effectively evaluated immediately after its inception. 
 The eight interview transcripts – and policy / media statements – were subjected 
to a contextualist method of thematic analysis, using a deductive approach that was 
theoretically-driven by the MSA. I acknowledge my personal position and role in the 
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research process and endeavoured to ensure that the thematic analysis of the interview 
data was undertaken with due care, attention and rigor to minimise the influence of my 
own identity markers as a gentile, white, English, female researcher. To this end, I re-
read the data set numerous times for any repeated patterns of meaning pertaining to 
anti-racism and efforts to combat antisemitism while mindful of the structural elements 
and central conceptual tenets of MSA, which guide the following results section 
organised around the problem, policy and politics streams.  
 
Problem Stream: Problematising the nature of the problem(s) of antisemitism in 
English football 
As outlined, the MSA’s problem stream involves policymakers identifying particular 
social conditions as ‘problems’ that need addressing. A problem must then align with 
the values and beliefs of policymakers in order to contribute to policy change. However, 
what became evident through my interviews was that there were different views on 
what the ‘problem’, or ‘problems’, actually is/are in terms of the nature of antisemitism 
within English football and therefore what needs addressing. The CST’s Dave Rich 
explained this was because, ‘Some antisemitic stuff just doesn’t quite get recognised as 
racism’. Indeed, for a while, antisemitism was not recognised as a specific problem in 
English football. Rich underlined the persistent efforts of key individuals in drawing 
antisemitism to the attention of The FA and anti-racist campaigners and how this 
initially fell on deaf ears:  
I don’t think it’s an organic response to a problem because for years the anti-
racist campaigns in football just didn’t include antisemitism, it just wasn’t part 
of the picture. It took years of nagging, firstly by Martin [Berliner] – he had the 
relationships with Kick It Out before we [CST] did – and of constantly making 





Berliner [MGB], who Rich inferred played a pivotal role as a ‘policy entrepreneur’, 
modestly attributed the early lobbying to another activist: ‘The pioneering of this – 
Jonathan Metliss [current Chair of Action Against Discrimination5] was involved 
before I was – certainly took a decade, if not more, to get it on the agenda’. Berliner 
outlined his personal involvement as CEO of Maccabi GB in trying to get antisemitism 
within grassroots and youth football recognised as a problem: 
When I first arrived here in 2000, we couldn’t get the topic on the agenda 
anywhere. We were telling them about anti-Jewish comments about gas 
chambers and ‘Hitler was right’ being made in under-12’s football… Today, 
we’re in a very different place and the work that we’ve done over that 17/18-
year period has actually moved it significantly onto the agenda.  
 
Berliner suggested Kick It Out were preoccupied during their infancy ‘because of the 
history of colour being a big issue’ and ‘didn’t register it on their website for many 
years’ as it vied for attention alongside racism towards larger minority groups: 
We argued with Piara Powar [CEO, 1997-2010] as to why antisemitism was 
different to maybe what they were doing and that Jews didn’t necessarily 
recognise the word ‘race’. Even their logo back then with the big, black 
background: Kick It Out became synonymous around colour. So our arguments 
around ethnicity and religion… were not really seen under that label. 
 
 
In this connection, Berliner pointed to the lack of professional Jewish footballers either 
being targeted themselves or able to challenge antisemitism, meaning the spotlight was 
on other forms of racism, particularly toward black footballers and supporters:  
The black lobby had a mouthpiece. This is something much more powerful than 
we did. They had black players. So every time there was an incident, you would 
see Cyril Regis or Brendan Batson voice their disapproval. But there was no one 
to talk on behalf of the Jewish community. We didn’t – still don’t – have many 
Jewish players: you could count them on one hand. 
 
At the time of writing, only twelve Jewish footballers have ever played in the English 
Premier League since its inception in 1992 (Sky Sports 2019).  
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The JLC’s Simon Johnson echoed Berliner in pointing to Kick It Out’s early 
confusion over how to classify and therefore deal with antisemitism as a problem in its 
own right – because Jews can define themselves by reference to race and/or religion – 
highlighting how, ‘The research into antisemitism will ask the question, “Is it part of 
racism or isn’t it?”’. Johnson pondered how antisemitism has ‘morphed into its separate 
own bespoke area of discrimination, which is odd’ and expanded: ‘It requires some 
market focus, but in terms of the nature of the abuse, the impact on victims, the way 
that it’s dealt with by the regulations and discipline, it’s exactly the same as any form 
of racism’. 
 Berliner [MGB] explained, after years of ‘chipping away at it, The FA finally 
recognised that there was an issue’. However, his sense of accomplishment that 
antisemitism was finally being publically recognised by The FA as a problem was 
tempered because: ‘Then they inexplicably linked it to Islamophobia. We [invited 
representatives from the Jewish and Muslim communities] were just looking at each 
other, thinking “why have they joined the two things together?” And this went on for a 
while’. Berliner was referring to The FA’s inaugural Faith Summit in April 2008. While 
the summit’s aim to eradicate religious abuse in football – particularly aimed at 
Muslims and Jews – was well-meaning, the merging of Islamophobia with antisemitism 
points to a failure by The FA to fully understand the respective problems, nor the 
nuanced ways in which antisemitism within English football is manifest, particularly 
centring around the common usage (and contested meanings) of the ‘taboo’ word ‘Yid’ 
in fan culture. For as Meer and Noorani (2008) point out, while there are historical-
structural similarities in both the larger political context, as well as the internal 
heterogeneity of Jews and Muslims, and while it can be helpful to share experiences 
and see what can be learned from an understanding of racism directed at another 
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minority, there are also different socio-historical dimensions between the Jewish and 
Muslim communities that need to be recognised. 
Awoderu [FA] agreed that the NGB was confused over how antisemitism 
should be dealt with and acknowledged the influence of John Mann MP, Chair of the 
APPG Against Antisemitism, as she reflected upon The FA’s sense of direction prior 
to her appointment in 2010: 
I think people in football did not see or feel that antisemitism was a 
discrimination issue, that discrimination was always about racism until The Y-
Word [2011] – well no, until 2008 when John Mann’s involvement and his 
report brought the subject matter much more to the forefront. 
   
Since being initially addressed in 2008 by The FA’s Faith Summit, then more publically 
in 2011, antisemitism has occupied a sporadic position on English football’s anti-
discrimination agenda. Berliner [MGB] observed, ‘It tends to go in cycles. It goes up 
and down because it depends what’s sort of flavour of the month’, while Rich [CST] 
noted, ‘Events drive the prioritisation and media coverage does’. The events that Rich 
refers to have tended to be incidents of antisemitism that agencies have reacted to, most 
often involving supporters, which have centred on the use of ‘Yid’ within the vernacular 
culture of fans, especially by Tottenham supporters. This is a problematic dimension of 
the antisemitism in English football for two reasons: first, there is a preoccupation with 
the term at the expense of other expressions of antisemitic rhetoric; second, there are 
polemic stances on Tottenham supporters’ adopted use of the word, which confuse – 
and arguably oversimplify – responses to tackling antisemitism more broadly. As far as 
attention afforded by campaigns, policies and interventions, Tottenham supporters are 
apparently rendered the foremost ‘problem’ and the ‘simple solution’ is deemed to be 
stopping them from using ‘Yid’/’Yid Army’ as a self-referent, with a delusional 
expectation that this will stop their abusers using antisemitic rhetoric towards them.  
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Arkush, from the Board of Deputies, and also Mann [APPG] were vehement 
about the contentious usage of the word by Tottenham supporters (whether Jewish or 
Gentile), with the latter arguing, ‘The Y-word is a key part of the problem. It’s not a 
badge of honour, it’s a badge of racism. There needs to be concerted action to stamp it 
out’. In contrast, Johnson [JLC] was concerned that, ‘The Y-word is in danger of being 
a red herring because – if that’s the only thing they think they need to address in order 
to deal with antisemitism – they won’t do it, it won’t succeed’. Johnson plainly 
recognised that antisemitism was a multi-dimensional problem and that there were other 
formations that needed addressing. He was unequivocal about where the focus of 
attention should be: 
There is a rather blind obsession with the Y-word. What I want to concentrate 
on are the Hitler chants, Hitler salutes, the hissing, and the genuine anti-Semites 
who are using abusive Holocaust denial, Holocaust justification, and songs 
minimising, diminishing the Holocaust – because in my view, that is the real 
antisemitism:  the people who do not know – or who do know and don’t care – 
that when you make a hissing noise, or sing a song about Belsen, or give a Hitler 
salute, you are trivialising the Holocaust. You are using the Holocaust in a way 
that every text book, every guide, every definition of racism tells you is a pure 
example of racism and antisemitism. That’s what we’ve got to concentrate on. 
 
Johnson’s comments expose a lack of agreement between the elite stakeholders and 
their respective agencies over what the key problem(s) pertaining to antisemitism in 
English football actually is and where efforts should be concentrated to tackle it.  
 Other problems of an antisemitic nature in English football, particularly those 
pertaining to the conduct of club officials and professional players have typically 
seemed to garner much less attention in terms of campaigns and policies than the 
behaviour of supporters. However, Johnson [JLC] described how, ‘The Anelka case 
became a bit of a cause célèbre within the Jewish community’. Berliner explained how 
the Jewish community looked to The FA to take decisive action: ‘We needed the full 
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weight of the authorities to say, “We are not going to accept this, we need to stamp this 
out”’. How Anelka’s quenelle was addressed is considered below. 
 
‘They were clueless’: Up the Policy Stream without a Paddle? 
In the MSA’s policy stream, experts within policy communities lobby for and propose 
ideas and solutions to an identified problem. My interviews indicate that this has proved 
to be problematic in terms of individuals or organisations proposing solutions to tackle 
antisemitism because of the previously identified lack of clarity over what the 
problem(s) of antisemitism is/are within English football and so where the focus should 
be, how to deal with it, and through which policy solutions, interventions and 
campaigns. Initially, the main concern was simply getting antisemitism recognised as a 
problem in itself on the wider anti-racism agenda in football, with the first public 
engagement with the issue being The FA’s 2008 Faith Summit. However, Johnson 
[JLC] stressed that this was not the first time that antisemitism was addressed, 
maintaining that when he worked at The FA, ‘It was on the radar. Antisemitism was 
one of the lower of the profile issues, but it was definitely developing its own bespoke 
profile’.  
Rich [CST] reflected, ‘There must have been people in The FA who saw it 
[addressing antisemitism] as something worth doing’ and while noting ‘… they were 
clueless at that stage’ added, ‘They committed to it’. Notwithstanding the frustrations 
felt within the Jewish organisations, the 2008 Faith Summit marks a milestone in 
antisemitism featuring on football’s anti-racist agenda. Also of note from the summit 
was an emergent policy idea to introduce a ‘strict liability’ rule whereby football clubs 
with supporters or layers found guilty of discriminatory abuse could face either league 
point deductions or the possibility of playing a set number of matches ‘behind closed 
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doors’. However, a watered-down version of this policy would not be implemented by 
The FA until 2014. 
 The first substantive set of policy recommendations for addressing antisemitism 
in professional and grassroots football, albeit alongside other faith-based abuse, came 
by way of Mann’s (2010) report on behalf of The FA’s Taskforce on Tackling 
Antisemitism and Islamophobia. The Taskforce was established after the Faith Summit 
in September 2008, with members from the Jewish and Muslim communities, the 
football authorities, Kick It Out, UK Football Policing Unit, Metropolitan Police, and 
Crown Prosecution Service6. Mann [APPG] explained why he was invited to lead the 
Taskforce: ‘The FA were concerned that they were getting issues of antisemitism raised 
and I don’t think they knew what to do about it’. Mann (2010) published a report on 
behalf of the Taskforce in January 2010, identifying ‘best practice’ and proposing 17 
diverse policies and interventions to tackle antisemitism and Islamophobia within 
professional and grassroots football aimed at spectators, participants, boardrooms and 
officialdom. This included: increasing Jewish participation in football; tightening The 
FA’s disciplinary measures and also criminal sanctions for racist behaviour; and 
requiring clubs to implement ‘safety charters’ and ‘educational toolkits’ to protect fans, 
footballers and local communities. Mann’s (2010) third recommendation centred on 
eliminating the use of ‘Yid/Yiddo’ by football supporters.  
The wide-ranging nature of the recommendations is indicative of the 
multifaceted problem of antisemitism within English football. Some of them were 
arguably aspirational, rather workable or achievable, but Rich [CST] underlined their 
importance: 
Once you’ve got a report with set of recommendations, you’ve got a structure 
you can work to and then it’s formalised. What it meant was all the future FA 
initiatives on combatting racism incorporated the outcome of that Taskforce. 
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Sometimes less than we wanted. Sometimes they still produced stuff that barely 
mentioned Jews and antisemitism, which we would complain about.    
 
Indeed, few of the report’s recommendations have been met, or even attempted by The 
FA, professional clubs, or other organisations, underlying the inaction on tackling 
antisemitism in English football. Mann [APPG] said that ‘lots’ of the recommendations 
could have been better addressed. Mann lamented how, ‘The FA hasn’t increased the 
involvement of young Jewish kids in football. That’s a problem’. Nor have The FA 
worked on the recommendation to develop a ‘Changing Chants Toolkit’ for clubs to 
help marginalise offensive chants ‘like “Yiddo”, anti-gypsy jibes, racist rants and 
homophobic slurs’, using the CST and other specialist groups alongside Kick it Out to 
develop educational materials (Mann 2010). Advocating tighter cyber-surveillance and 
regulation of football supporters to combat such chants, Mann commented: ‘When 
you’re selling tickets electronically, to credit cards, to named people, it’s very easy to 
do. Control that and you can identify any football fan with ease in a modern stadium. 
There’s a reluctance [by clubs, English Premier League, and The FA] to do it’. 
Another approach to addressing the songs and chants of supporters can be seen 
in Kick It Out’s 2-minute awareness-raising campaign film The Y-Word, launched in 
April 2011 in conjunction with Maccabi GB, CST, and the Shoresh Foundation (a 
Jewish charitable trust), who helped fund the project. The Y-Word was conceived and 
written by Jewish brothers, David Baddiel (a well-known comedian, writer and 
television presenter) and Ivor Baddiel (a television producer). They approached Kick It 
Out with their film concept after they challenged a fellow Chelsea fan for singing ‘Fuck 
the Yids’ followed by ‘Fuck the Jews’. Their short-film received a mixed reception in 
the British and Jewish news media and also social media, with many Tottenham 
supporters resenting the apparent attempt to censure them for historically appropriating 
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the word to negate the antisemitic abuse they received, rather than target their abusers 
(Poulton and Durell 2016). 
 All of my interviewees acknowledged the personal influence of David and Ivor 
Baddiel in ‘telling a persuasive story to frame a policy problem to grab an audiences’ 
interest’ (Cairney 2016) and attracting attention to the issues raised by Kick It Out’s 
The Y-Word. While the MSA ‘helps to clarify the role of ‘timing’ and idioms such as 
‘being in the right place at the right time’ in policymaking’ (Cairney 2018: 206), in the 
case of the Baddiel brothers, with their insider access to the cultural establishment and 
media outlets, a more accurate observation might be ‘getting in the right place, with the 
right people, at the right time’. In securing both access and resources, the Baddiels 
proved to be highly skilled at ‘coupling’. They were able to use their ‘well known-ness’ 
as oxygen for publicity and to gain support from the relevant third-sector organisations 
within the Jewish community, as well as Kick It Out, and to gain funding from them. 
However, this project and the media and public attention it attracted did not lead to the 
formulation or implementation of a policy on use the term ‘Yid’ from The FA – or 
antisemitism more broadly – in English football at this time.  
 Aworderu, who was not at The FA at the time, believed The Y-Word was ‘more 
of a game-changer than the report that John did – although the two go hand-in-hand – 
in terms of bringing the subject matter to the forefront. Before, I don’t think people 
really ‘got’ why this was a problem’. As a means of addressing antisemitism in English 
football, Rich [CST] recognised the film’s effectiveness in initiating debate: ‘It was a 
useful campaigning tool. It certainly raised the issue, brought attention to the issue, got 
people discussing it and talking about it. So, in that respect, it worked as an intervention 
to get the issue on people’s agenda’. In contrast, Johnson [JLC] contested: 
The Y-Word was an awareness-raising exercise, rather than the first targeted 
intervention. It wasn’t a [policy] measure because I don’t think it changed 
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anybody’s behaviour. In my view, it raised awareness. I don’t think it solved a 
problem. It highlighted an issue.  
 
Interestingly in this connection, Kick It Out’s CEO, Roisin Wood, revealed that The Y-
Word film might be revisited because of the criticism it has received from myself 
(Poulton 2016) and many Tottenham supporters for appearing to target them, rather 
than their abusers:  
We’re looking at the film again, mainly because of a lot of the concerns that 
you’ve raised with us to be honest… Most of our reports are about hissing – 
‘Gas the Jews’ – and related to the Holocaust and therefore if we’re going to do 
a film about this again, then I think that’s what we need to focus on.  
 
Wood’s comments on The Y-Word – along with the interviewees’ different views on 
the actual term – point again to a lack of clarity over how to deal with the issue and the 
disagreement over whether Tottenham supporters should be targeted to desist self-
referencing as ‘Yids’/‘Yid Army’/‘Yiddos’, as well as the nature of the problem(s) 
pertaining to antisemitism within English football more broadly. 
 Curiously, The FA had been publicly quiet on antisemitism since their 2008 
Faith Summit and completely silent on the debate over use of ‘Yid’ that ensued after 
The Y-Word’s release. It was therefore surprising that a month into the 2013-14 season, 
The Football Association (2013) issued an unprecedented public statement warning 
fans that ‘use of the term [Yid] in a public setting could amount to a criminal offence, 
and leave those fans liable to prosecution and potentially a lengthy Football Banning 
Order’. The policy statement, endorsing criminal sanctions, said that the word ‘is likely 
to be considered offensive by the reasonable observer’ and is ‘inappropriate in a football 
setting’ (ibid.). The Prime Minister at the time, David Cameron, became immersed in 
the ensuing public ‘Y-word debate’ when he commented to The Jewish Chronicle: 
‘There’s a difference between Spurs fans self-describing themselves as Yids and 
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someone calling someone a Yid as an insult. Hate speech should be prosecuted - but 
only when it’s motivated by hate’ (Pollard 2013).  
A month later in October 2013, three Tottenham supporters were singled out, 
arrested and charged with a racially aggravated (not motivated) offence under Section 
5 of the Public Order Act 1986 for repeated use of ‘Yid’ inside Tottenham’s stadium. 
These arrests caused further consternation amongst Tottenham supporters, with many 
believing they were again being wrongly targeted, this time by The FA and 
consequently the criminal justice system (Poulton 2016). The Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) discontinued the case against the three Tottenham fans the eve of their 
criminal trial in March 2014, citing the standard of proof needed for conviction and the 
context in which the word was used (Poulton 2016).  
The FA have not publically commented on the CPS’s withdrawal of the criminal 
charges, nor reiterated their positioning since 2013. This is an example of a policy 
action being initiated, but falling onto the backburner, rather than being a substantial 
agenda change. Asked whether this was because The FA have rescinded their position, 
Awoderu confirmed that their support for criminal sanctions in respect of the use of 
‘Yid’ has not changed: 
No, why would you retract that statement? It is better to send a positive message 
out to those who would be affected and impacted than to be sitting on the fence 
about it, which we had done for years. It may appear that there is a 
misalignment, but there is no way we would have made our statement [on use 
of ‘Yid’] without making sure we were aligned with the CPS on this. It was 
absolutely the right thing for The FA to do in terms of declaring that positioning, 
rather than having the perception that we don’t take antisemitism seriously. 
 
Awoderu argued that the CPS’ decision to discontinue the prosecutions was specific to 
the facts of ‘as and when the word was used’ in those individual cases and whether 
there was a ‘realistic prospect of conviction’. This leaves open the possibility that there 
could be future circumstances in which the use of the word in a public setting could still 
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amount to a criminal offence. From this, it would seem that The FA are unmoved by 
the controversy and criticism that these arrests and the aborted trial caused. 
 There was more consensus among my interviewees on how The FA dealt with 
an expressive form of antisemitism by a professional footballer in 2014. Johnson [JLC] 
underlined the significance of the case: 
I could see the potential for this to be a test case that would go one way or the 
other.  If The FA refused to bring action against Nicolas Anelka – or took action 
and found the case against him not proven – I think it would have set back the 
cause of anti-racism, not just antisemitism, by ten years and we would have to 
have changed the rules and regulations... As it happened, he was found guilty 
and so it set a really important precedent, not just for dealing with antisemitism, 
but for dealing with any act of racism because it establishes strict liability.  
 
The FA fined Anelka £80,000 and issued him with a five-match ban and mandatory 
education course. Notwithstanding this, Anelka’s punishment was the most lenient that 
The FA could have imposed under their newly revised anti-discrimination rules and 
comparatively light compared to the respective disciplinary action received by 
footballers John Terry and Luis Suarez for their respective racist offences (Burdsey 
2014). Anelka’s club, West Brom, suspended him and later terminated his contract. 
Summarising the impact of The FA’s sanctions against both Anelka and also Wigan 
Chairman, Dave Whelan, Johnson [JLC] concluded: ‘Those were really visible, high-
profile steps. If you are serious about stamping out racism then you have to show you’ve 
dealt with this. Then everybody – fans included – can see footballers and club chairmen 
don’t get away with it’. 
Arkush confirmed the Board of Deputies were satisfied with The FA’s policy 
action in dealing with Anelka: ‘We insisted The FA had a proper investigation, which 
there was, and the Board were consultees to that and gave evidence. I think The FA did 
deal with that quite effectively and then one or two players [Benoit Assou-Ekotto and 
Yannick Sagbo] who subsequently expressed support for Anelka’. Rich [CST] and 
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Mann [APPG] concurred with the symbolic importance of these disciplinary 
proceedings for the Jewish organisations and community more broadly, with Mann 
explaining it was, ‘The watershed moment. That’s when people in the Jewish 
community thought, “Hang on a minute, The FA is serious”’.  
Here Mann recognises and applauds how the effectiveness of The FA over this 
incident through the implementation of their policy instilled a confidence that had been 
previously lacking in the competence of the NGB. Ahmed (2006) emphasises that 
sufficient conditions need to be in place for anti-racism to function; this requires a shift 
from a rhetorical commitment to change, to one actually committed to the performance 
of proposed change. The Football Association (2013) statement and their ensuing 
handling of the Anelka case suggest that The FA – albeit three years after Mann’s 
(2010) Taskforce report – finally moved from rhetoric to decisive action on 
antisemitism from the perception of the Jewish community. 
 The question of what more could be done to tackle antisemitism in English 
football and whether policies should be underpinned by education, advocacy or 
sanctions elicited a variety of responses from my interviewees, suggesting varying 
levels of satisfaction or confidence that the problem(s) is/are being effectively 
addressed and that policy ideas and solutions remain in the ‘garbage can’ still awaiting 
adoption. Rich [CST] observed: 
Everyone knows what needs to be done and by who. And it’s all being done 
already, to varying extents, it’s just a question of how much more do we need 
to do, or can we do, and can we be a bit more creative about how to do it?  But 
it’s not like there’s some golden bullet out there that no one has thought of. 
 
Rich’s response is interesting because the interviews affirmed that none of the 
organisations and agencies, despite their best intentions, actually seemed to know what 
to do as coherent policy to address the different expressive forms of antisemitism within 
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English football in the various spheres and levels of the game, none least because of the 
preoccupation with the use of ‘Yid’. Nonetheless, Rich identified the two main 
problems he believes need to be the focus of continuing efforts: ‘We need to try to 
convert all this anecdotal stuff we hear about into actual reports’. This work, according 
to Rich, is primarily being undertaken by Jewish organisations – ‘Maccabi, us [CST], 
Kick It Out, all the usual agencies are trying’ – rather than The FA who actually have 
the power and authority to implement policy. For example, CST and Maccabi worked 
with Kick It Out (2016) to increase awareness of the reporting and support mechanisms 
available, producing ‘Playing the Game: Reporting Antisemitism in Football’, a 
downloadable brochure for Jewish community. 
 The other problem pertaining to antisemitism that Rich [CST] would like to see 
continuing efforts on is ‘the bigger scale, mass fans singing antisemitic songs in the 
football ground, on trains, or wherever’. He reflected on the conundrum facing agencies 
given the effort and resources that this already receives: 
We already have the campaigns telling people not to and you already have 
people getting arrested for it. What else can be done? I’m not sure what else can 
be done to prevent those small numbers of fans from singing that stuff in the 
first place because the obvious things to stop it are already happening. 
 
The FA’s Lynch was keen to ‘keep it [antisemitism] on the agenda, not wait for 
incidents to happen’. He believed the best way to do this was through ‘more education’. 
Johnson [JLC] agreed, but advocated punitive measures: ‘I think we’re in a period 
where the education work has taken us so far; we need now to just make sure there are 
high-profile, visible deterrents through the [NGB] disciplinary system’. Mann [APPG] 
also proposed more stringent punishments – including criminal action – for perpetrators 
of antisemitism, bemoaning how: ‘It seems less of an issue. People get away with it’.  
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 Over the decade since antisemitism was finally recognised as a specific problem 
requiring bespoke policy solutions, the focus of the most high-profile campaign (Kick 
It Out’s The Y-Word film) and also The Football Association’s (2013) statement have 
been on the use of ‘Yid’ within fan culture, particularly by Tottenham supporters. 
Indeed, they seem to be a ‘convenient problem’ for targeted action and perhaps a 
diversion from other problems of casual antisemitism expressed by opposing clubs’ 
fans, players, club officials and even CEO of The FA. Notwithstanding this, there has 
been improvement in recent years with the policy agenda substantially advanced with 
regard to NGB sanctions for players and club officials – seen most noticeably through 
The FA’s decisive action against Anelka.  
 
Politics Stream: ‘These things slip down the priority list’ 
 
The political stream within the MSA includes factors such as public mood, 
lobbyist/pressure group campaigns, and ideological distributions or persuasions within 
government or organisational structure. These factors affect whether the environment 
is ripe for policy entrepreneurs to turn the spotlight onto their ‘problem’ and for 
policymakers to turn a proposed solution into a policy (Cairney and Jones 2016). 
However, as outlined, there has not really been consensus on what the ‘problem’ 
actually is/are and consequently ‘solutions’ have been reactive to perceived expressions 
of antisemitism – especially involving football supporters – rather than proactive. My 
interviews also revealed that to compound matters, the political stream has not always 
been conducive to adopting an integrated approach to tackling antisemitism in football; 
perhaps because of the multiple agencies/interested parties (from both football and the 
Jewish community) involved and also because The FA has not taken a consistent lead 
as the NGB, with both the jurisdiction and resources.  
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 Reviewing the pieces of work undertaken to date to tackle antisemitism, Mann 
[APPG] concluded: ‘Kick it Out have done things. The FA’s done a bit. The FA could 
do more. The clubs could do a lot more. It needs The FA to take the lead, then I think 
those clubs would fall into line because they would feel more obliged to do so’. Arkush 
[BoD] was more critical:  
I don’t think the clubs, or The FA, actually have a really thorough, ongoing, 
genuine commitment. I think the reason you see spikes, separated by a couple 
of years, is when they’re pushed or shamed into action by some really gross 
manifestation of racism under their nose.  
 
Berliner [MGB] likewise identified the intermittent interest in antisemitism within 
football and also criticised the failure of The FA, Premier League, and UEFA to 
demonstrate authority and direction: ‘It is reactive rather than proactive. There is a lack 
of leadership on the topic and when something major goes wrong, everybody 
collectively starts reacting and there’s still no leader’. As the NGB, that leadership 
should come from The FA as only they have the ultimate authority to implement policy 
upon English football. Despite the expectations upon them, the likes of Kick It Out, as 
a campaigning organisation, can only raise awareness of issues; they have no 
jurisdiction or power. 
Noteworthy in terms of the governance of The FA, there have been several 
Jewish men in positions of power and influence within the NGB, yet none were policy 
entrepreneurs, nor apparently not championed the problem of antisemitism in English 
football. In addition to one of my interviewees, Simon Johnson [JLC], who worked at 
The FA 2005-2010, they included: David Dein (Vice-Chairman, 2000-2004); Lord 
Triesman (Chairman, 2008 to 2010); David Bernstein (Chairman, 2011-2013). Mann 
[APPG] commented, ‘They could have done more’. My Jewish interviewees were more 
conciliatory. Rich [CST] noted, ‘You do get this phenomenon – not just in football, in 
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politics as well – high profile Jewish people who don’t want to be identified as ‘the 
Jew’, who don’t want to only speak out on Jewish issues’. Similarly, Berliner [MGB] 
sympathised: ‘A very awkward situation for them as Jews in prominent positions’. 
Johnson [JLC] was candid about his own involvement: ‘From my position as the officer 
in charge of race equality, if I had spent all my time on antisemitism and ignored other 
larger minority groups, I’d never have got anywhere with the black and Asian 
communities’.  
This situation infers that even with potentially influential Jewish men within the 
NGB, the conditions were still not conducive in the political stream to tackle 
antisemitism in English football. Another factor to consider in this context is the lack 
of famous Jewish footballers playing in the English professional leagues as either 
targets for, or challengers to, antisemitism. This in turn would explain a lack of media 
and political interest. Instead, Rich [CST] highlighted the significant contribution made 
by John Mann to ‘push it as an issue’ after the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into 
Antisemitism in 2006. As Cairney (2018: 203) observes, policymakers ‘pay attention 
to things they care about, or are familiar with’. Being Chair of the APPG Against 
Antisemitism, this was a cause dear to Mann and, together with his political experience 
as a parliamentarian, he was able to use his ‘knowledge of the process to further their 
own policy ends’ (Kingdon 1984: 21). In this way, Mann can be recognised as a key 
policy entrepreneur for facilitating antisemitism getting recognised in English football, 
even though he was unable to couple all three streams. 
 Another issue pertaining to The FA’s governance surfaced in relation to why it 
took them twenty-two months to officially respond to Mann’s (2010) report. Mann 
commented: ‘The FA’s structures for dealing with this remain arcane and anti-
democratic and that’s a fundamental problem’. Johnson [JLC], who worked at The FA 
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until 2010, conceded: ‘By the time I left The FA, it was nowhere. It was sitting in the 
abyss, it was in a vacuum’. This suggests a lack of underpinning political commitment 
and receptivity from The FA, which limits policy development. Rich [CST] said of the 
delay, ‘Unless you’ve always got people from the outside nudging, these things slip 
down the priority list’. Rich’s insight emphasises the influential role of policy 
entrepreneurs in lobbying for an issue to be addressed. As the MSA framework 
explains, policy entrepreneurs must use their knowledge, influence and tenacity while 
awaiting the convergence of all three streams to exploit a window of opportunity. In the 
meantime, an issue such as antisemitism may get pushed to the backburner as it vies for 
position on football’s main anti-discrimination agenda. 
This might explain the delay in the NGB acting upon Mann’s (2010: 6) 
recommendation to ‘help clubs phase out racist chants like Yiddo’. Awoderu explained 
why The FA (2013) issued their positioning on use of ‘Yid’ after a long interlude, 
during which they did not enter the public debate: 
We weren’t visible. The reason why people perceived us to be quiet was because 
we were. So we needed to put that marker down to make it clear that – based on 
our rules and regulations – it was something that we were prepared to take on. 
It was a way of drawing a line between this sort of unconscious acceptance [of 
supporters using ‘Yid’] to, ‘We will deal with it if it is reported’. This was 
something we just couldn’t turn a blind eye to any more. John Mann’s report 
was there and one of his recommendations was very much for The FA to sort 
this out, so this was all part of that work.  
 
The FA’s statement was unforeseen by stakeholders within the Jewish community 
organisations and also Kick It Out. Surprisingly, none were consulted or pre-warned 
prior to its release. Both Rich from CST and Wood from Kick It Out seemed bemused 
as they remembered the abrupt timing and substance of The FA’s statement. Wood 
recalled, ‘My first thought was, “How are they going to implement that? How are you 
going to police that whole stand who are all singing? Are you going to arrest them all?”’ 
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Lynch [FA], who has worked for both agencies, reflected, ‘I think now there 
would be a lot more consultation done with The FA and Kick It Out, and the PFA, the 
Premier League, the Football League’. These comments by my interviewees were 
revealing with regard to the role that each organisation played and the relationships 
between them. Organisational fragmentation had been clearly writ large in the past. In 
MSA terms, this would have prevented a coupling of the three streams. I sensed that 
collaboration between the agencies had been somewhat fractured, with The FA in 
particular being insular and detached. This explains why the political stream has not 
always been receptive to tackling the problem(s) of antisemitism in English football.  
Awoderu [FA] implicitly acknowledged that The FA had perhaps not always 
led by example: ‘The FA is a national governing body and so therefore it needs to 
provide leadership and direction, which is about much more collectiveness and working 
through the stakeholders’. She also underlined the responsibility of ‘the 92 
[professional English] clubs and certainly for the 20 [in the Premier League]’. 
Advocating that, ‘a multi-agency approach that works best’, Lynch [FA] observed: 
‘Where this whole agenda really flourishes is when everyone works together. It sounds 
a bit cliché, but actually there was a moment when everyone was really working 
together. The FA can do certain things that Kick It Out can’t do and vice versa’. He was 
referring to ‘a round table, behind-closed-doors meeting on the back of the Anelka case 
with CST, Maccabi, Board of Deputies, to discuss what had happened, but also to get 
people’s thoughts and views’. Lynch said of the meeting: ‘People are still talking about 
that being a good exercise and a good intervention from a stakeholder-relations 
perspective’.  
It was apparent that this meeting had been an anomaly and that there was an 
appetite for more regular consultation and coordination with the NGB from the other 
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agencies moving forward to address antisemitism in English football through a more 
collective and coordinated approach. Having worked previously for Kick It Out – who 
Wood [KIO] entreated ‘try really, really hard’ to coordinate and work with other 
agencies – Lynch found the working environment and practices rather different at The 
FA: ‘I was surprised when I came here, the lack of that really, but that might be a 
cultural thing. I think The FA would be, “We don’t really need to tell you because we’re 
The FA”. I think that’s known and people here would probably concede that’. Awoderu 
[FA], acknowledging that The FA have had a poor record on imparting or exchanging 
information with other agencies, commented, ‘But we’ve got better at communicating 
and a lot of that is to do with confidence within us and new leadership coming in 
because there are things that we do communicate and entrust that they will manage 
sensitively through the channels they need to’.  
Defending The FA, she explained that they were not always at liberty to share 
information – ‘whether it’s Kick It Out or anybody’ – due to legal constraints. Awoderu 
recognised that The FA’s silence and apparent secrecy can be perplexing: ‘Sometimes, 
particularly if it’s a racism case, it’s really difficult for the wider community to 
understand why we can’t be transparent with Kick It Out and equally Kick It Out feel 
very frustrated that we can’t articulate certain things’. She had particular sympathy for 
Kick It Out and the assumptions and expectations people have about their size, authority 
and capacity: 
We understand that they’re the ones who are getting the bashing. There is this 
perception that football doesn’t care and even Kick It Out doesn’t care. Kick It 
Out are powerless because people think they’re this massive organisation and 
that they can influence and take everybody to task, but it doesn’t work like that. 
Kick It Out would probably need to be a multinational company in order deal 
with football’s ills. 
 
Kick It Out has seventeen employees and received £645,000 in core funding for the 
2017-18 season (Wilson 2019). Berliner [MGB] blamed The FA for their lack of 
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financial support and lamented that the wealth in professional football is not better 
distributed: ‘Roisin [Wood] certainly struggles with her resources. They’re completely 
underfunded for the work they can do’. These thoughts were echoed by Rich [CST], 
who praised Kick It Out’s CEO: ‘I do think Roisin’s been very good in terms of pushing 
it and seeing antisemitism as an important issue’. This is illustrative of how a 
transformation of organisational infrastructure through change of personnel, who 
ideologically perhaps is more receptive to a particular policy problem, can influence 
policy change. It also sheds light on how Kick It Out’s funding (and staffing) is 
stretched and how widening their remit to all forms of discrimination may mean these 
financial and human resources are being spread too thinly. 
 While not the sympathy reserved for Kick It Out, there was some empathy with 
The FA. Wood [KIO] explained how the reforms introduced by The FA in March 2017 
after their review of governance to ensure compliance with Sport England’s Code for 
Sports Governance – following a parliamentary motion of no confidence – had placed 
strain on personnel: 
The Equality Department we used to deal with is not there anymore. They’ve 
been moved to parts of other departments or made redundant. We feel very 
much that we’ve just had to go and do stuff on our own because you couldn’t 
get anything out of The FA during the review. 
 
Wood emphasised how, ‘We’re independent of The FA and we’re very clear about that. 
People think we are part of them and that’s something we fight strongly against’. 
Demonstrating this independence from the NGB and preparedness to challenge their 
main funder, she explained: 
We have worked very hard with The FA to help them see their processes from 
a victim’s point of view. This has involved quite robust exchange of views and 
we have not always seen eye-to-eye. We have also talked to them about how 
they publish their reasons especially around high profile cases, so that everyone 
can realise how they reached their decisions. It feels much more of a 
collaborative process now, but we have to continue to try and make the reporting 
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process as transparent, effective and responsive for those who are brave enough 
to make a complaint. 
 
These comments suggest that working relations and cooperation with the NGB have 
improved over recent years, perhaps rendering a more conducive climate for a more 
collaborative approach to tackling antisemitism in the future. 
  
Conclusion 
This article has explained the emergence of campaigns, initiatives and policy statements 
issued by anti-racist groups, governing bodies and non-government agencies to address 
antisemitism in English football through a thematic analysis of eight elite stakeholder 
interviews. Gaining qualitative data through these stakeholder interviews has 
contributed significantly to the in-depth explanation of the policy processes involved in 
the attempts to tackle antisemitism presented here. The article demonstrates how MSA 
continues to be a useful approach for understanding agenda-setting, the importance of 
‘policy windows’, interest group lobbying, and especially the role of policy 
entrepreneurs in this regard. Previous studies have been keen to use MSA to show 
dramatic or significant policy formulation, legitimation and implementation. However, 
this study is theoretically distinctive in the way it demonstrates how MSA can also 
explain limited policy change.  
The MSA framework helps to explain the apparent ad hoc nature of agency 
responses to antisemitism in English football, particularly from the NGB as the ultimate 
authority with jurisdiction and resources for policymaking. Significantly though, this 
application of MSA has shown that the streams have never been aligned for a policy 
window to be open wide enough, which explains the lack of dramatic policy 
development to comprehensively tackle antisemitism within English football. MSA 
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was originally designed for and is usually applied to public policymaking by a single 
government or organisation. Yet MSA can also be orientated to analyse agenda-setting 
and policymaking that addresses an ill-defined problem or multi-dimensional problems 
and also when there is the complex network of organisations (in this case from both 
football and the Jewish community) attempting to address the issue. My interviews 
revealed there were various ‘problems’ pertaining to the phenomenon of antisemitism 
that were emergent and prominent at various times within English football and that the 
stakeholders sometimes had different views on the relative significance of these 
respective problems. Emphasis has tended to be, as is often the case, on the behaviour 
of football supporters. 
 Analysis of the primary data yielded from the interviews with key stakeholders 
present two main findings. First, the study demonstrates that antisemitism has only had 
intermittent salience on the wider anti-racism agenda in English football, suggesting a 
lack of underpinning political commitment and understanding – and especially 
leadership from The FA – which limits proactive and comprehensive policy change or 
development. This lack of receptivity and support for action to tackle antisemitism 
within policy-making networks is reflected in the wider political stream. Apart from 
John Mann’s involvement – and a brief comment by David Cameron – there has been 
little evidence of governmental (for example, by the Home Office or Department for 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport) or parliamentary interest in what is after all a much 
broader socio-political issue. There has been even less evidence of a groundswell of 
public awareness, let alone support, for action. A further challenge is that antisemitism 
is competing for attention in the ‘primordial soup’ of other forms of discrimination, 
some of which are more obvious, for example based on colour. Given that the Jewish 
population is very small in England – and with no high profile Jewish professional 
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footballers, unlike other minority ethnic groups – antisemitism has often been down the 
pecking order of issues to be tackled. The challenge in gaining access to the policy 
agenda is further complicated because antisemitism is less clearly defined and 
understood, due of its heterogeneous manifestations underpinned by religion, ethnicity, 
geopolitics, or a combination. 
 That antisemitism does find a presence on the anti-discrimination agenda can 
be attributed to the second main finding of this study: the invaluable work of dedicated, 
persistent policy entrepreneurs. The data highlights how Martin Berliner (from Maccabi 
GB), alongside Jonathan Metliss (now Chair of Action Against Discrimination), were 
the early activists trying to ‘knock down doors’ to persuade The FA and Kick It Out 
that antisemitism needed addressing in both grassroots and professional football. Those 
pioneers were followed by John Mann MP and David and Ivor Baddiel, who epitomise 
the role of policy entrepreneurs. Each can be identified as highly motivated, passionate 
people, dedicated to tackling antisemitism, who proposed solutions to the problems they 
saw, mobilising public opinion and institutions like The FA and Kick It Out, to ensure 
their ideas were prominent. Mann and the Baddiels in particular, due to their political 
and public prominence, were very adept at ‘coupling’ and so able to connect 
developments across the multiple streams. These budding policy entrepreneurs pushed 
attention toward what they saw as the main problems pertaining to antisemitism in 
English football and pushed their ‘pet solutions’, but the politics stream was 
insufficiently aligned at these moments. This was mainly due to The FA being 
preoccupied with other forms of discrimination compounded by other regulatory issues, 
including their own governance and lack of diversity, rather than receptive to 
comprehensive policy development or implementation. Only The FA has the 
jurisdiction to lead on this, but it has not so far been forthcoming. 
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  This critical analysis of campaigns, initiatives and policies to tackle 
antisemitism in English football has highlighted a recurring focus on the word ‘Yid’ as 
their misguided starting point. Indeed, Simon Johnson, Chief Executive of the Jewish 
Leadership Council, who has worked for The FA and English Premier League, argues 
that there is an ‘obsession with the Y-word going on within some parts of the anti-
racism in football’. The appropriation of the term by some Tottenham supporters 
appears to blur and undermine the clarity on what the ‘real’ problem(s) of antisemitism 
is. A coherent and comprehensive policy to tackle antisemitism in English football 
should encompass all expressions of antisemitic rhetoric, rather than make central the 
prevailing focus on supporters’ use of ‘Yid’, especially by Tottenham supporters. The 
focus should extend to the playing field and offices of those working in football. In this 
connection, several of my interviewees, including John Mann [APPG], Funke Awoderu 
[FA] and Jonathan Arkush [BoD], suggested that professional football clubs had a 
responsibility to do more to address antisemitism. 
Importantly, proposals for tackling antisemitism in football should also be 
invited from and involve working with supporters’ associations, trusts and fan groups. 
Football supporters do not like being told what to do: persuasion not diktat, might in 
time lead to cultural shifts, aided by self-policing, not force. Lastly, future solutions to 
tackle antisemitism reside in much more consistent ‘joined up’ thinking and 
collaboration between key agencies and stakeholders. This requires The FA to regularly 
consult and seek expert advice or recommendations from the specialists at Kick It Out, 
together with representatives from relevant community groups or organisations, such 
as the CST, Jewish Leadership Council, Board of Deputies, Maccabi GB, and Holocaust 
Educational Trust, as well as football supporters.  
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An example of such collaboration in action is Chelsea FC’s ‘Say No to 
Antisemitism’ campaign, which launched on Holocaust Memorial Day 2018. Chelsea, 
working with Kick It Out and CST, have provided a training guide for football stadia 
stewards to help improve understanding of antisemitic behaviour. This is especially 
welcome given some of Chelsea’s fan-base are notorious for their antisemitic and racial 
abuse. Chelsea also commissioned a new film, directed by Ivor Baddiel, who made The 
Y-Word. It shows social media posts and supporters singing antisemitic songs 
interspersed with graphic images from Auschwitz, emphasising the hurtful nature of 
such rhetoric and the defamation of the memory of the Holocaust. There is much less 
focus on the word ‘Yid’, as Kick It Out’s Roisin Wood promised during her interview. 
 This article advances our knowledge and understanding of antisemitism within 
English football and also fills the current research gap on theoretical explanations of 
the anti-racist policymaking process through an original application and critique of the 
multiple streams approach. The study of antisemitism in football is vital for 
comprehending other forms of racism, faith-based abuse, xenophobia, and hate-crime 
more broadly. Antisemitism is a global problem. This specific showcase of 
antisemitism in English football is used to shed light on the wider phenomenon that 
prevails across European football. In finding appropriate solutions to the problem(s) of 
antisemitism within English football, the expectation and hope is that these can transfer 
not just internationally and to other sports, but also to wider aspects of social life to help 







1. Adopted by 31 states, including the UK, France, Germany, Canada and USA, 
the IHRA definition is not without controversy. It was disavowed by the 
(opposition) British Labour Party before its contentious adoption in July 2018, 
due to disagreement over its wording about Israel and anti-Zionism, as well as 
debates over freedom of expression and a hierarchy of racisms. 
2. The situation is different in Scotland, where the religious and political 
sectarianism that underpins the Glasgow derby has led to sections of Celtic 
supporters – a club that reflects the Irish-Catholic minority within the city – 
flying Palestinian flags when playing Israeli clubs in European competitions as 
expressions of solidarity with Palestinian liberation struggles and opposition to 
Zionism and the State of Israel. This a position that many Celtic supporters have 
embraced based on their own personal or ancestral experiences with ‘British 
oppression’ (Conner 2014). Their rivals, Rangers supporters, also express their 
contrasting geo-political ideology and sometimes fly Israeli flags.   
3. In a survey of their season-ticket holders (n.11389) by Tottenham Hotspur 
Football Club (2014) to gauge opinion on the use of ‘Yid’, seventy-four per cent 
of non-Jewish respondents and seventy-three per cent of Jewish respondents 
were in favour of being allowed to use the word. At the time of writing (on the 
eve of 2019/20 English season, Tottenham Hotspur initiated a new ‘consultation 
exercise on the use of the Y-word’ with their official supporters’ club 
membership.    
4. Within the ‘garbage can model’, participants ‘dump’ largely unrelated problems 
and solutions. 
5. Action Against Discrimination is a small registered charity (established 2014) 
to promote knowledge and mutual understanding between racial groups and to 
eliminate discrimination on the grounds of race. Most of their work focuses on 
antisemitism. They oppose the use of ‘Yid’ by Tottenham supporters. 
6. The CPS prosecutes criminal cases that have been investigated by the police in 
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